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Abstract
We study the problem of learning classifiers with a fairness constraint, with three main contributions
towards the goal of quantifying the problem’s inherent tradeoffs. First, we relate two existing fairness
measures to cost-sensitive risks. Second, we show that for cost-sensitive classification and fairness measures,
the optimal classifier is an instance-dependent thresholding of the class-probability function. Third, we show
how the tradeoff between accuracy and fairness is determined by the alignment between the class-probabilities
for the target and sensitive features. Underpinning our analysis is a general framework that casts the problem
of learning with a fairness requirement as one of minimising the difference of two statistical risks.
1 Introduction
Suppose we wish to learn a classifier to determine suitable candidates for a job. This classifier may accept as
inputs various characteristics about a candidate, such as their interview performance, qualifications, and years
of experience. Suppose one of these characteristics is deemed sensitive, e.g. their race. Then, we might be
required to constrain the classifier to not be overly discriminative with respect to this sensitive feature. Subject
to this constraint, we would of course like our classifier to be as accurate as possible. This is known as the
fairness-aware learning problem, and has received considerable attention in the machine learning community
of late [Pedreshi et al., 2008, Kamiran and Calders, 2009, Calders and Verwer, 2010, Dwork et al., 2012,
Kamishima et al., 2012, Fukuchi et al., 2013, Zafar et al., 2016, Hardt et al., 2016, Zafar et al., 2017]. The
primary focus has been on formalising what constitutes a perfectly fair classifier, and how one learns a classifier
to approximately achieve such fairness. There have been several distinct proposals in both regards (see §2.2).
In this paper, we are interested in the tradeoffs inherent in the problem of learning with a fairness requirement.
We specifically focus on the impact fairness has on two aspects of our original problem: the structure of
the optimal solution, and the degradation in performance. Our three main contributions C1—C3 comprise
analyses of both issues:
C1: we provide a reduction of two popular existing fairness measures to cost-sensitive risks (Lemmas 1, 2).
C2: we show that for such cost-sensitive classification and fairness measures, the optimal fairness-aware
classifier is an instance-dependent thresholding of the class-probability function (Propositions 3, 4).
C3: we provide a measure of the alignment between the class-probabilities for the target and sensitive features,
which quantifies the degradation in performance owing to the fairness requirement (Propositions 8, 9).
A consequence of C1 is a simple procedure for learning with a fairness requirement, involving training
separate class-probability estimators for the target and sensitive features, and combining them suitably (§5.3).
Underpinning our analysis is a general framework casting the fairness-aware learning problem as one of
minimising the difference of two statistical risks (§2.2), which allows for an abstract, generic treatment of the
problem.
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2 Background and notation
We fix notation and review relevant background. Table 1 summarises some core concepts that we refer to
frequently.
2.1 Standard learning from binary labels
Let X ⊆ Rd be a measurable instance space, e.g. characteristics of a candidate for a job. In standard learning
from binary labels, we have samples from a distribution D over X × {0, 1}, with (X,Y) ∼ D. Here, Y is some
target feature we would like to predict, e.g. whether to hire a candidate. Our goal is to output a measurable
randomised classifier parametrised by f : X→ [0, 1] that distinguishes between positive (Y = 1) and negative
(Y = 0) instances. A randomised classifier predicts any x ∈ X to be positive with probability f (x); the quality
of any such classifier is assessed by a statistical risk R(·; D) : [0, 1]X → R+ which, for some Φ : [0, 1]3 → R+,
is [Narasimhan et al., 2014]
R( f ; D) .= Φ(FNR( f ; D), FPR( f ; D), P(Y = 1)),
for the false-negative and false-positive rates
(FNR( f ; D), FPR( f ; D)) .=
(
E
X |Y=1
[1 − f (X)] , E
X |Y=0
[ f (X)]
)
, (1)
which are average class-conditional probabilities of error when classifying x ∈ X as positive with probability
f (x).
Example 1. The cost-sensitive error with cost parameter c ∈ (0, 1) is parametrised by Φ : (u, v, p) 7→
p · (1 − c) · u + (1 − p) · c · v. When c = P(Y = 1), this is a scaled version of the balanced error,
Rbal( f ; D) = (FNR( f ; D) + FPR( f ; D))/2. (2)
A Bayes-optimal randomised classifier for a risk is any f ∗ ∈ Argmin R( f ; D). For a broad class of Φ,
the optimal classifier is a (possibly distribution dependent) thresholding of the class-probability function,
f ∗(x) = nη(x) > t∗(D)o [Narasimhan et al., 2014], where η(x) .= P(Y = 1 | X = x) and n·o denotes the indicator
function. For the cost-sensitive error with parameter c, the Bayes-optimal classifier is f ∗(x) = nη(x) > co
[Elkan, 2001]. These Bayes-optimal classifiers motivate a plugin estimator, where one thresholds an empirical
estimate of η [Narasimhan et al., 2014].
2.2 Fairness-aware learning
In fairness-aware learning, one modifies the standard problem of learning from binary labels in two ways. The
statistical setup is modified by assuming that in addition to the target feature Y, there is some sensitive feature
Y¯ we would like to treat in some special way, e.g. the race of a candidate. The classifier evaluation is modified
by assuming that we reward classifiers that are “fair” in the treatment of Y¯. To make this goal concrete, the
literature has studied notions of perfect and approximate fairness. (We construct a general formalism for the
problem using these in Problem 1.)
Perfect fairness. We will focus on two simple notions of perfect fairness, stated in terms of the random
variables Y, Y¯, and classifier prediction Yˆ | X ∼ Bernoulli( f (X)). (Note that we assume Y¯ to be binary.) The
first is demographic parity [Calders and Verwer, 2010], which requires the predictions to be independent of the
sensitive feature:
P(Yˆ = 1 | Y¯ = 0) = P(Yˆ = 1 | Y¯ = 1). (3)
The second is equality of opportunity [Hardt et al., 2016], which requires the predictions to be independent of
the sensitive feature, but only for the positive instances:
P(Yˆ = 1 | Y = 1, Y¯ = 0) = P(Yˆ = 1 | Y = 1, Y¯ = 1).
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Symbol Meaning
X Instance
Y Target feature
Y¯ Sensitive feature
D Distribution P(X,Y)
D¯ One of {D¯DP, D¯EO}
D¯DP Distribution P(X, Y¯)
D¯EO Distribution P(X, Y¯ | Y = 1)
Symbol Meaning
f Classifier
Rperf Performance measure
Rfair Fairness measure
Rfair Symmetrised fairness
η(x) P(Y = 1 | X = x)
ηDP(x) P(Y¯ = 1 | X = x)
ηEO(x) P(Y¯ = 1 | X = x,Y = 1)
Table 1: Glossary of commonly used symbols.
Other notions of perfect fairness include equalised odds [Hardt et al., 2016], and lack of disparate mistreatment
[Zafar et al., 2017]. Demographic parity has received the most study; however, it is known to have deficiencies
[Dwork et al., 2012, Hardt et al., 2016, Zafar et al., 2017].
Approximate fairness. We will focus on two fairness measures that quantify the degree of fairness a given
classifier possesses. The first is the disparate impact (DI) factor [Feldman et al., 2015], which is the ratio of
the probabilities appearing in the definition of demographic parity:
DI( f ) .= P(Yˆ = 1 | Y¯ = 0)
P(Yˆ = 1 | Y¯ = 1) . (4)
The second is the mean difference (MD) score [Calders and Verwer, 2010], which replaces the ratio with a
difference:
MD( f ) .= P(Yˆ = 1 | Y¯ = 1) − P(Yˆ = 1 | Y¯ = 0). (5)
We refer the reader to Žliobaite˙ [2015] for a survey of other fairness measures, including variants of the above.
A final remark is that the sensitive feature may or may not be available when one trains the classifier (see §5.2).
Avoiding the use of the sensitive feature by itself does not guard against discrimination [Pedreshi et al., 2008].
2.3 Existing work on fairness
Fairness has received considerable study in philosophy and welfare economics [Rawls, 1971, Sen, 2009];
however, with few exceptions [Bimore, 1994, Binmore, 2005], there is little formal utilitarian literature that
grapples with fairness. See Appendix E for a more detailed overview.
In the machine learning community, Dwork et al. [2012] proposed an approach to guarantee fairness relying
on a metric over instances. Zemel et al. [2013], Louizos et al. [2016] proposed approaches to learn feature
representations that guarantee fairness. Both methods depend directly on the specific instances x ∈ X. In
contrast, our approach never touches the instances, but only risks; this has the substantial advantage of avoiding
change under reparametrisation, and avoids the infinite regress of determining what is “similar”.
3 Fairness measures as statistical risks
We present our general view of fairness measures as statistical risks where the sensitive feature is the target.
This lets us analyse fairness measures using tools for studying risks.
3.1 General fairness measures
To formalise the notion of a fairness measure, we first specify our statistical setup for fairness-aware learning.
Let Djnt be a joint distribution over X × {0, 1} × {0, 1}, with random variables (X, Y¯,Y) ∼ Djnt. Here, X
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represents the instance, Y the target feature, and Y¯ the sensitive feature. We will be interested in three induced
distributions: we refer to P(X,Y) as D, P(X, Y¯) as D¯DP, and P(X, Y¯ | Y = 1) as D¯EO. We use D¯ to refer
generically to either D¯DP or D¯EO.
In fairness-aware learning, our goal is to output a randomised classifier1 f : X→ [0, 1] with small statistical
risk on D, so that Y is well predicted; we will denote this risk by Rperf(·; D), and refer to it as a performance
measure. In addition to this goal, we also want f to have large fairness measure Rfair(·; Djnt) : [0, 1]X → R+.
Formally:
Problem 1. Given a distribution Djnt, performance and fairness measures Rperf , Rfair, and tradeoff parameter
λ > 0, minimise the combined risk
Rfull( f ; Djnt, λ) .= Rperf( f ; D) − λ · Rfair( f ; D¯). (6)
We will primarily focus on the following tractable special case of the above problem. (See §6.1 for a slight
variant.)
3.2 Classification-type fairness measures
In Problem 1, Rfair depends on Djnt, which is defined over the triplet (X, Y¯,Y). An interesting sub-class of
Rfair are those that depend only on D¯DP, which is defined over the tuple (X, Y¯). As with Rperf , such Rfair
can be written as a statistical risk on D¯DP: in particular, given some Φfair : [0, 1]3 → R+, we may define a
classification-type fairness measure via
Rfair( f ; D¯DP) .= Φfair((FPR( f ; D¯DP), FNR( f ; D¯DP), P(Y¯ = 1))).
Intuitively, we are testing whether we can predict the sensitive feature Y¯ from X. When it is possible to do so
well according to Rfair, we do not have fairness.
Returning to the two fairness measures of §2.2, we observe that FPR( f ; D¯DP) = P(Yˆ = 1 | Y¯ = 0) and
FNR( f ; D¯DP) = P(Yˆ = 0 | Y¯ = 1); thus, they are expressible as risks.
Example 2. The disparate impact factor may be written
DI( f ; D¯DP) .= FPR( f ; D¯DP)1 − FNR( f ; D¯DP)
, (7)
i.e. it uses Φfair : (u, v, p) 7→ v1−u .
Example 3. The mean difference score may be written
MD( f ; D¯DP) .= 1 − FNR( f ; D¯DP) − FPR( f ; D¯DP), (8)
i.e. it uses Φfair : (u, v, p) 7→ 1 − (u + v).
We make a few remarks on this class of fairness measures. First, by casting fairness measures as statistical
risks, Equation 6 becomes the problem of minimising the difference of two statistical risks. This is a departure
from standard tradeoffs between two risks, where one considers the sum rather than the difference; fairness
measures are unusual as we seek to maximise the underlying risk Rfair.
Second, we can in principle plug-in any standard Φfair and get a sensible measure of fairness. However, certain
Φfair may be more convenient to work with, e.g. from the point of view of interpretability; this is the case for
disparate impact, which has roots in the 80% rule of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
[EEOC, 1979].
1Here and elsewhere, this is understood to mean a randomised classifier parametrised by f .
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Third, there is no requirement to restrict attention to D¯DP. In particular, we could equally use a risk on D¯EO,
yielding
Rfair( f ; D¯EO) .= Φfair((FPR( f ; D¯EO), FNR( f ; D¯EO), P(Y¯ = 1))),
which aligns with the equality of opportunity objective.
Fourth, in general one needs to impose additional structure on Rfair to guarantee fairness, as we now discuss.
3.3 Anti-classifiers and symmetrised fairness
Employing a statistical risk for Rfair in Equation 6 constrains the false-positive and negative rates. However, these
constraints may assume our classifier is non-trivial on D¯DP; as an example, if a classifier f has MD( f ; D¯DP) = τ,
then MD(1 − f ; D¯DP) = 1 − τ. Thus, one might be able to deceive such measures via an anti-classifier; i.e.
one which has high fairness, but whose negation has low fairness.
Intuitively, one wishes to disallow such a trivial transformation from adversely affecting fairness. A simple
way to do this is to consider the symmetrised fairness measure
Rfair( f ; Djnt)
.
= Rfair( f ; Djnt) ∧ Rfair(1 − f ; Djnt), (9)
where ∧ denotes the min operation. Maximising Equation 9 requires that both the classifier and the
anti-classifier perform well. Such symmetrised measures simply modify the underlying Φfair: note that
FPR(1 − f ) = 1 − FPR( f ), and similarly for FNR(1 − f ). Thus, Rfair is parametrised by
Φfair(u, v, p)
.
= Φfair(u, v, p) ∧ Φfair(1 − u, 1 − v, p).
In §4.4, we show that a broad class of Φfair have Φfair maximised when f ≡ 1/2; i.e. a completely random
classifier is maximally fair. (We can equally enforce that f ≡ p¯i is maximally fair via a simple correction; see
Appendix C.)
3.4 Relation to existing work
The notion that statistical risks on D¯DP are suitable as fairness measures is implicit in prior surveys of such
measures. Formalising this notion lets us subsequently use tools for studying risks to analyse a range of fairness
measures.
The need for symmetrised fairness has not received much attention, with works employing the MD and DI
scores e.g. Calders and Verwer [2010], Feldman et al. [2015] implicitly assuming that learned classifiers will
perform better than random guessing on D¯DP.
4 A cost-sensitive view of fairness measures
The previous section cast the DI and MD fairness measures as statistical risks on D¯. We now show how they
may be further related to cost-sensitive risks. This implies that analysis of cost-sensitive fairness measures
suffices to analyse both these measures. To begin, we first introduce a useful reparameterisation of the standard
cost-sensitive risk.
4.1 Balanced cost-sensitive risk
Recall that the standard cost-sensitive risk (Example 1) is parametrised byΦ : (u, v, p) 7→ p·(1−c)·u+(1−p)·c·v.
Now define the balanced cost-sensitive risk to be parametrised by Φbal : (u, v, p) 7→ 2 · Φ(u, v, 1/2), so that
CSbal( f ; D, c) .= (1 − c) · FNR( f ; D) + c · FPR( f ; D). (10)
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When c = 1/2, we get the balanced error (Equation 2). In general, this is simply a scaled and reparameterised
version of the standard cost-sensitive risk: we have CS( f ; D, c) = (α+ β) ·CSbal( f ; D, c′), where α = pi · (1− c),
β = (1 − pi) · c, and c′ = β/(α + β). This reparameterisation will however prove convenient in analysing
existing fairness measures.
4.2 Disparate impact and cost-sensitive risk
Our first result is that the disparate impact factor (Equation 7) can be related to the balanced cost-sensitive risk.
This suggests that study of the latter helps understand the former.
Lemma 1. Pick any distribution D¯ and randomised classifier f . Then, for any τ ∈ [0, 1], if c .= 11+τ ∈
[ 1
2, 1
]
,
DI( f ; D¯) ≥ τ ⇐⇒ CSbal( f ; D¯, c) ≥ 1 − c, (11)
DI( f ; D¯) ≥ τ ⇐⇒ CSbal( f ; D, c) ∈ [1 − c, c]. (12)
We make two remarks. First, Lemma 1 does not imply that disparate impact equals a cost-sensitive risk,
but rather, that their superlevel sets are related. This nonetheless means that a disparate impact constraint is
equivalent to a cost-sensitive constraint, with the latter being easier to analyse.
Second, as Lemma 1 holds for any distribution D¯, we can plug in D¯EO, yielding an equivalent result for
disparate impact in an “equality of opportunity” regime, i.e. DI( f ; D¯EO).
4.3 Mean difference score and balanced error
Our next result is that the mean difference score (Equation 8) has a strong connection to a balanced cost-sensitive
risk.
Lemma 2. Pick any distribution D¯ and randomised classifier f . Then, for any τ ∈ [0, 1], if c = 1+τ2 ∈
[ 1
2, 1
]
,
MD( f ; D¯) = 1 − 2 · CSbal
(
f ; D¯, 1/2) (13)
MD( f ; D¯) ≥ τ ⇐⇒ CSbal
(
f ; D¯, 1/2) ≥ 1 − c
MD( f ; D¯) ≥ τ ⇐⇒ CSbal
(
f ; D¯, 1/2) ∈ [1 − c, c] .
Thus, the MD score is a transformation of the balanced error, as the latter corresponds to c = 1/2. Note that
Equation 13 implies an equivalence of risks, and not just super-level sets.
Note also that for the MD score, the corresponding balanced cost-sensitive risk has a cost-parameter that does
not depend on the chosen τ. This proves beneficial for the purposes of learning with this measure, as we shall
see in §5.3.
4.4 The cost-sensitive fairness problem
The above results establish the versatility of cost-sensitive fairness measures. In the sequel, we will thus focus
on such measures for general cost parameters, relying on Lemmas 1 and 2 to relate statements about them to
statements about the DI and MD scores. For symmetry, we will also focus on cost-sensitive risks for the base
problem, albeit with a possibly different cost parameter.
The above requires one tweak: as per §3.3, it is desirable to work with symmetrised versions of any fairness
measure. For general balanced cost-sensitive risks, these symmetrised versions have a simple form: it is an
easy calculation that for any c ∈ [0, 1] and classifier f , CSbal(1 − f ; D¯, c¯) = 1 − CSbal( f ; D¯, c¯). Thus, the
symmetrised version is
CSbal( f ; D¯, c¯) = CSbal( f ; D¯, c¯) ∧ (1 − CSbal( f ; D¯, c¯)). (14)
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This risk is maximised when CSbal( f ; D¯, c) = 1/2. A sufficient condition for this is f ≡ 1/2, so that, in line with
our intuition, a completely random classifier is maximally fair.
Equipped with this, we can formalise the special case of the general Problem 1 that is the focus of the sequel.
Problem 2. Given a distributionDjnt, costs c, c¯, and tradeoff parameter λ ∈ R, minimise (for D˜ ∈ {D¯DP, D¯EO}),
Rfull( f ; D, D˜, c, c¯, λ) .= CS( f ; D, c) − λ · CS( f ; D˜, c¯). (15)
We make three comments on Problem 2. First, we use the standard rather than balanced cost-sensitive risk
as it simplifies the analysis in subsequent sections; recall from §4.1 that the two are related by a scaling and
reparameterisation.
Second, Equation 15 employs the standard (non-symmetrised) cost-sensitive measure, but without a positivity
constraint on λ. This is because, by Equation 14, a constraint on the symmetrised risk imposes upper and
lower bounds on the cost-sensitive risk. Then, λ is the difference in the Lagrange multipliers for these two
constraints, which need not be positive; see Appendix D for more discussion.
Third, there is a subtlety in using Problem 2 as a proxy for the DI. As noted above, it is only the superlevel
sets of the DI that are related to that of a cost-sensitive risk, and not the DI itself. This manifests in the cost
parameter c¯ itself being a user-specified parameter, unlike for the MD score where it is fixed at 1/2. We will
discuss this issue more in §5.3.
4.5 Relation to existing work
Lemma 1 is a special case of a broader relationship between fractional performance measures and “level-finder”
functions [Parambath et al., 2014, Theorem 1], [Narasimhan et al., 2015, Lemma 7]. Feldman et al. [2015]
related the disparate impact to the balanced error, but their bound depends on the distribution and classifier,
while ours uses a cost-sensitive risk with constant τ; see §7 and Appendix F.
5 Bayes-optimal fairness-aware classifiers
Having formalised the fairness-aware learning problem, and having further related existing fairness measures
to cost-sensitive risks, we are in a position to study the tradeoffs imposed by the problem. We begin by
asking: what impact does the fairness requirement have on the Bayes-optimal solutions? The structure of these
solutions provides insight into the problem, and also suggests a simple practical algorithm. In the following,
we utilise the following quantities:
η(x) .= P(Y = 1 | X = x) pi .= P(Y = 1)
ηDP(x) .= P(Y¯ = 1 | X = x) p¯i .= P(Y¯ = 1)
ηEO(x) .= P(Y¯ = 1 | X = x,Y = 1).
(16)
5.1 Bayes-optimal cost-sensitive classifiers
We will study the Bayes-optimal classifiers of Problem 2, so that both our fairness and performance measures
are cost-sensitive risks. When working with D¯DP (i.e. the demographic parity setting), Equation 15 admits an
interesting minimiser.
Proposition 3. Pick any distribution Djnt, costs c, c¯ ∈ [0, 1], and λ ∈ R. Then,
Argmin
f ∈[0,1]X
Rfull( f ; D, D¯DP, c, c¯, λ) =
{
f ∗ | (∀x) s∗(x) , 0 =⇒ f ∗(x) = ns∗(x) > 0o}, (17)
(∀x ∈ X) s∗(x) .= η(x) − c − λ · (ηDP(x) − c¯). (18)
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Two comments are in order. First, we observe that the optimal classifier above is in fact deterministic, except
for those x for which s∗(x) is exactly 0. In general, for a given λ, we expect this to only hold for few or no
x ∈ X. When s∗(x) = 0, however, then any value of f ∗(x) will be optimal.
Second, assuming s∗(x) , 0, when λ = 0, the optimal f ∗ is the familiar Bayes-optimal classifier for a
cost-sensitive risk, nη(x) > co. For λ , 0, however, we have an instance dependent threshold correction, which
depends on ηDP(x). The correction increases the standard threshold of c whenever ηDP(x) > c¯; intuitively,
when we are confident in the sensitive feature being active for an instance, we are more conservative in
classifying the instance as positive.
We now consider a fairness measure that reflects the equality of opportunity notion, and thus works with D¯EO
rather than D¯DP. This results in a slightly different Bayes-optimal classifier.
Proposition 4. Pick any Djnt, costs c, c¯ ∈ [0, 1], and λ ∈ R. Then,
Argmin
f ∈[0,1]X
Rfull( f ; D, D¯EO, c, c¯, λ) =
{
f ∗ | (∀x) s∗(x) , 0 =⇒ f ∗(x) = ns∗(x) > 0o}, (19)
(∀x ∈ X) s∗(x) .=
(
1 − λ · pi−1 · (ηEO(X) − c¯)
)
· η(x) − c.
This result is of the same flavour as Proposition 3, with two important differences. First, we only need to know
the probability of the sensitive feature being active for the positive instances. Second, the form of the threshold
correction is no longer additive, but multiplicative.
5.2 Special case: using the sensitive feature as input
The previous section studied a general X, where the sensitive feature was not necessarily provided as input to
the classifier. The form of the optimal classifier simplifies when we allow the sensitive feature as an input. We
have the following analogue of Proposition 3 when working with D¯DP.
Corollary 5. Pick any distribution Djnt where D includes the sensitive feature, costs c, c¯ ∈ [0, 1], and λ ∈ R.
For η(x, y¯) = P(Y = 1 | X = x, Y¯ = y¯),
Argmin
f ∈[0,1]X×{0,1}
Rfull( f ; D, D¯DP, c, c¯, λ) =
{
f ∗ | (∀x, y¯) s∗(x, y¯) , 0 =⇒ f ∗(x, y¯) = ns∗(x, y¯) > 0o},
(∀x ∈ X) s∗(x, 0) .= η(x, 0) − c + λ · c¯
(∀x ∈ X) s∗(x, 1) .= η(x, 1) − c − λ · (1 − c¯).
Here, instead of an instance-dependent threshold, we simply apply different (constant) thresholds to the
class-probabilities for each value of the sensitive feature. This is a simple consequence of Proposition 3, as we
can simply consider one of the features of X to be perfectly predictive of the sensitive feature, which makes
ηDP(x, y¯) ∈ {0, 1}.
An analogous special case holds for Proposition 4, and is deferred to Corollary 14 of the Appendix.
5.3 A plugin approach to fairness-aware learning
The Bayes-optimal classifiers derived above rely on thresholding the class-probabilities η and η¯. Thus,
analogously to the Bayes-optimal classifiers for standard statistical risks, this motivates a simple plugin
estimation approach to fairness-aware learning problem: estimate η, η¯ separately, e.g. by logistic regression,
and then combine them as per Equations 17, 18 to construct a classifier. When the sensitive feature is available,
then all that is needed is a single model for η(x, y¯), which is thresholded separately for each of the sensitive
feature values.
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We make three comments on the proposed approach. First, one must of course tune λ to achieve a desirable
tradeoff between accuracy and fairness. This fortunately does not require retraining any model, as we can
simply employ the learned η, η¯ and appropriately change how they are thresholded to form a classifier. One can
tune λ, so as to reach some desired operating point on the accuracy-fairness curve.
Second, if we find s∗(x) = 0 for some x ∈ X, any prediction for that x optimises the objective of Equation 15;
however, we may seek to tune this prediction to favour e.g. maximal performance on the original problem.
Third, we reiterate that for the disparate impact, the cost parameter c¯ must be tuned as well, but that as per λ,
this does not require retraining any model.
5.4 Relation to existing work
Computing the Bayes-optimal classifiers as above is not without precedent: Hardt et al. [2016], Corbett-Davies
et al. [2017] considered the same question, but in the case of exact fairness measures. We are not aware of
prior work on computing the optimal classifiers for approximate fairness measures. While the results have a
similar flavour to the exact fairness case, explicating them is important to understand the full tradeoff between
accuracy and fairness (§6), and also suggests a simple algorithm.
Hardt et al. [2016] proposed to construct a fairness-aware classifier in the equality of opportunity setting by
post-processing the results of a classifier trained on the original problem. They considered a slightly different
constrained version of the problem, where one forces the solution to have perfect rather than approximate
fairness. Our Propositions 3 and 4 provide an explicit form for the correction when approximate fairness is
desired, as well as when the sensitive feature is available or not during training. Recently, Woodworth et al.
Woodworth et al. [2017] established limits on the post-processing approach of Hardt et al. [2016]; studying
this in our context of approximate fairness measures would be of interest.
Calders and Verwer [2010] proposed to modify the output of naïve Bayes so as to minimise the MD score.
However, their approaches do have any theoretical guarantees.
Our plugin learning procedure merely requires estimating class-probabilities, which for logistic regression is a
convex problem. This avoids optimisation challenges facing existing approaches. For example, one way to
approximately solve Equation 15 is to pick convex surrogate losses `, ¯`: {0, 1} × R → R+, and find [Zafar
et al., 2016, 2017]
s∗ ∈ Argmin
s : X→R
CS(s; D, c, `) − λ · CS(s; D¯, c¯, ¯`)
for the surrogate cost-sensitive risk [Scott, 2012],
CS(s; D, c, `) .= E
(X,Y)∼D
[CY · `(Y, s(X))] (20)
for C1 = 1 − c,C0 = c. Note however that for nonlinear ¯`, this objective will be non-convex in s. Even if one
manages to overcome this challenge, guaranteeing large surrogate fairness does not imply large fairness of the
underlying classifier, as the former is an upper bound to the latter. Similar problems plague related approaches
based on regularisation [Kamishima et al., 2012, Fukuchi et al., 2013].
6 Quantifying the accuracy-fairness tradeoff
We now study the tradeoff between performance on our base problem and fairness, and show it is quantifiable
by a measure of alignment of the target and sensitive variables.
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6.1 The fairness frontier
Our definition of the fairness-aware learning problem (Problem 1) was in terms of a linear tradeoff between the
performance and fairness measures. To quantify the tradeoff2 imposed by a fairness constraint, we will study
the following explicitly constrained problem: for τ ∈ [0, 1], let
f ∗τ ∈ Argmin
f : X→[0,1]
Rperf( f ; D) : Rfair( f ; D¯) ≥ τ (21)
F(τ) = Rperf( f ∗τ ; D) − Rperf( f ∗0 ; D). (22)
The function F : [0, 1] → R+ represents the fairness frontier: for a given lower bound on (symmetrised)
fairness, it measures the best excess risk over the solution without a fairness constraint. Evidently, F(·) is
non-decreasing since the constraints on Rfair are nested as τ increases; i.e., demanding more fairness can never
improve performance.
As per the previous section, the case of cost-sensitive performance and fairness measures is of interest. Here,
the objectives in Equations 6 and 21 are related by the Lagrangian principle; see Appendix D for details.
Further, when X is finite, Equation 21 reduces to a linear program. (For infinite X we obtain a semi-infinite
linear program [Goberna and Lopéz, 1998], whose duality is subtler to analyse.)
Lemma 6. For finite X, pick any distribution Djnt, costs c, c¯ ∈ [0, 1], and τ ∈ R+. Then, the problem
min
f : X→[0,1]
CS( f ; D, c) : CS( f ; D¯, c¯) ≥ τ
is expressible as a linear program.
Exploiting this linearity of the objective and constraints, we can further establish that the frontier is a convex
curve. We caution that this result requires equivalence of Rfair and a cost-sensitive risk, and so is not applicable
for the DI factor.
Lemma 7. Pick any distribution Djnt, and cost-sensitive performance and fairness measures. Then, the
function F : R+ → R+ of Equation 22 is convex.
While Lemmas 6 and 7 are useful for computing the frontier, they do not specify how the curve’s behaviour as
τ is varied relates to properties of Djnt. We now study this issue.
6.2 The frontier and class-probability alignment
To obtain our first distribution-dependent statement about the curve, observe that F(τ) = 0 for any τ ∈ [0, τ∗],
where τ∗ = Rfair( f ∗0 ; D¯). This simply means that there is no penalty from a fairness constraint when we consider
the fairness attained by the Bayes-optimal classifier for the original problem. Intuitively, when D and D¯ are
disaligned, we expect this τ∗ to be large, so that there is no effect from virtually any fairness constraint.
We can formalise this notion of disalignment. Recall from Equation 16 that η, η¯ are the class-probabilities of
the target and sensitive features respectively. With a cost-sensitive risk for Rperf , the Bayes-optimal classifier is
f ∗(x) = nη(x) > co. The incurred errors for predicting Y¯ with f ∗ are then
FPR( f ∗; D¯) = 1
1 − p¯i · EX [(1 − η¯(X)) · nη(X) > co]
FNR( f ∗; D¯) = 1
p¯i
· E
X
[η¯(X) · nη(X) < co] .
(23)
Both these terms measure a form of disalignment of η and η¯, specifically looking at the concentration of the
latter in regions where the former is above or below the threshold c. If Rfair is parametrised by Φfair, we then
find
τ∗ = Φfair(FPR( f ; D¯), FNR( f ; D¯), p¯i).
2We stress that the tradeoff measured here is one inherent to the problem, rather than one owing to the technique one uses.
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Figure 1: Illustration of fairness frontiers and probability disalignment. See text for description of parameter t.
For generic Φfair, we can plug in Equation 23 to get an explicit expression for τ∗. In the case of cost-sensitive
Φfair, this expression involves a concrete measure of disalignment.
Proposition 8. Pick any distribution Djnt, and cost-sensitive performance and fairness measures with cost
parameters c, c¯. Then, F(τ) = 0 for any τ ∈ [0, τ∗], where
τ∗ = min(∆c, c¯(η¯, η),∆−c, c¯(η¯,−η))
∆c, c¯(η¯, η) = E
X
[
Bc, c¯(η¯(X), η(X))
] − Iϕ(P¯1, P¯0),
where P¯y = P(X | Y¯ = y), Iϕ(·, ·) denotes an f -divergence,
ϕ(t) .= −((1 − c¯) · p¯i · t) ∧ (c¯ · (1 − p¯i))
Bc, c¯(η¯, η) .= |η¯ − c¯ | · n(η¯ − c¯) · (η − c) < 0o. (24)
Unpacking the above, Equation 24 gives a concrete notion of disalignment between η and η¯ – which measures
how much they disagree around the respective thresholds c and c¯ – and shows that when this disalignment is
high, the fairness constraint has less of an effect. The additional f -divergence term is an intrinsic statement
about D¯: when the class-conditionals of D¯ strongly overlap, i.e. there is limited predictability of the sensitive
label from the features, then also the fairness constraint has less of an effect. Finally, the min(·, ·) term arises
from using symmetrised fairness.
Proposition 8 specifies how much fairness we can ask for without paying any performance penalty. When there
is a penalty, however, how does this depend on Djnt? To understand this, we appeal to Bayes-optimal classifiers
to Problem 2, whose closed form reveals that the frontier is determined by a similar notion of disalignment.
Proposition 9. Pick anyDjnt, and cost-sensitive performance and fairness measures with parameters c, c¯. Given
τ ∈ [0, 1], there is some λ ∈ R and Bayes-optimal randomised classifier f ∗ ∈ Argmin
f ∈[0,1]X
Rfull( f ; D, D¯, c, c¯, λ) with
F(τ) = E
X
[(c − η(X)) · ( f ∗(X) − nη(X) > co)] .
If further this f ∗ is deterministic i.e. Im( f ∗) ⊆ {0, 1},
F(τ) = E
X
[
Bλ,c, c¯(η(X), η¯(X))
]
(25)
where Bλ,c, c¯(·, ·) is defined by
Bλ,c, c¯(η, η¯) .= |η − c | · n(η − c) · (η − c − λ · (η¯ − c¯)) < 0o.
The function Bλ,c, c¯(·, ·) above has a similar flavour as Equation 24, and also measures the disalignment of η
and η¯ in terms of disagreement around respective thresholds c, c¯. However, there is additionally a dependence
on λ, which depends in some non-trivial manner on τ. We note that the requirement that f ∗ be deterministic
may be dropped, at the expense of an additional term in Equation 25 that depends on the alignment of the
non-deterministic component and η.
We make two final comments. First, the above result holds for both the MD and DI factor, as it only requires
the superlevel sets to coincide with those of a cost-sensitive risk. Second, our notions of (dis)alignment are,
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Figure 3: Comparison of plugin (2LR) and COV meth-
ods as tuning parameters for both are varied.
roughly, analogous to the notion of compatibility functions in semi-supervised learning [Balcan and Blum,
2010], wherein one can guarantee that unlabelled data is useful when there is an alignment of the marginal
data distribution with one’s function class.
To get an intuitive feel for the disalignment function of Equation 24, we illustrate the frontier for some simple
distributions. Consider first the case where X = [−1, 1], and D is such that η(x) = nx > 0o and the marginal
over instances is uniform. Suppose also that η¯(x) = nx > to, for t some parameter to be specified. Consider a
cost-sensitive performance and fairness measure with c = c¯ = 1/2. We can explicitly compute the frontier here,
shown in Figure 1(a) for a range of t. As t increases, η and η¯ grow increasingly dissimilar, and so the fairness
constraint does not affect performance as dramatically: this is manifest in the fact that τ∗ increases with t, as
predicted by Equation 24. Further, for every t, when there is a tradeoff, it is linear.
Suppose we instead have η(x) = (1 + exp(−x))−1, and retain the same η¯. Here again, Figure 1(b) shows that as
t increases, η and η¯ grow increasingly dissimilar, and we find that τ∗ again increases with t. The impact of
changing the shape of η is the effect on the frontier when it is nonzero: as per Equation 25, this depends on the
deviation of η from c, and hence the frontier here is nonlinear.
7 Experiments
We present an experiment inspired by Feldman et al. [2015], who aimed to certify whether a dataset admits
disparate impact (i.e. one can achieve DI( f ; D¯) ≤ τ for fixed τ) by testing if the minimal achievable balanced
error is below some threshold (see Appendix F). Rather than employ the balanced error, we follow Lemma 1
and assess the minimal achievable balanced cost-sensitive risk for c = (1 + τ)−1.
Specifically, following Feldman et al. [2015], we consider the UCI german dataset with Y¯ denoting whether or
not the age of a person is above 25, and fix τ = 0.8. For a number of train-test splits to be specified, we train
models to minimise the cost-sensitive logistic loss with parameter c (Equation 20), and evaluate on the test
set the disparate impact, as well as the gap ∆( f ) .= CSbal( f ; D¯, c) − (1 − c). Our Lemma 1 indicates that we
should find the latter to be positive only when the former is larger than τ = 0.8.
To construct our training sets, we make an initial 2:1 train-test split of the full data, treating Y¯ as the label to
predict. To obtain models with varying levels of accuracy in predicting Y¯, we inject symmetric label noise
of varying rates into the training (but not the test) set. Figure 6.2 shows that for the resulting models, as per
Lemma 1, there is perfect agreement of disparate impact at τ = 0.8 and sign(∆( f )).
We next present an experiment analogous to Zafar et al. [2016], where on the same german dataset we learn
a classifier that respects a symmetrised MD score constraint, while being accurate for predicting the target
variable in the sense of balanced error (BER). We employ the plugin estimator proposed in §5.3, training
logistic regression models to predict the target and sensitive variable and then combining them via Equation 17
for some λ ∈ R. On the test set, we compute the BER for the target variable, and the symmetrised MD score
for the sensitive variable. We then employ the COV method of Zafar et al. [2016], which uses a surrogate to the
MD constraint as discussed in §5.4, with tuning parameter τ ∈ R+ to control the MD score.
Varying λ and τ yields tradeoff curves for both methods. Figure 6.2 shows these curves at high fairness value,
where we see that our plugin approach is generally competitive with COV, resulting in lower BER at higher
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fairness levels. (See Appendix G for further experiments.) This illustrates that our Bayes-optimal analysis of
Problem 2 may be useful in designing fairness-aware classifiers.
8 Conclusion and future work
We studied the tradeoffs inherent in the problem of learning with a fairness constraint, showing that for cost-
sensitive fairness measures, the optimal classifier is an instance-dependent thresholding of the class-probability
function, and quantifying the degradation in performance by a measure of alignment of the target and sensitive
variable.
There are several interesting directions for future work. To name a few, we believe it valuable to study
Bayes-optimal scorers for ranking measures such as AUC; establish consistency of the plugin estimators of §5;
quantify the impact of working with a finite sample; and extend our analysis to the case of multi-category
sensitive features.
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Appendix
A Proofs of results in main body
Proof of Lemma 1. By definition,
FPR( f ; D¯)
1 − FNR( f ; D¯) ≥ τ ⇐⇒ FPR( f ; D¯) ≥ τ − τ · FNR( f ; D¯) , since FNR( f ; D¯) ≤ 1
⇐⇒ τ · FNR( f ; D¯) + FPR( f ; D¯) ≥ τ
⇐⇒ τ
1 + τ
· FNR( f ; D¯) + 1
1 + τ
· FPR( f ; D¯) ≥ τ
1 + τ
⇐⇒ (1 − c) · FNR( f ; D¯) + c · FPR( f ; D¯) ≥ 1 − c
⇐⇒ CSbal( f ; D¯, c) ≥ 1 − c.
The first result follows by definition of disparate impact.
The above may be trivially extended to a symmetrised version of the disparate impact (Equation 9). This is
since one may equally apply the above to the anti-classifier 1 − f ; further, we have
CSbal(1 − f ; D, c) = 1 − CSbal( f ; D, c),
and so DI(1 − f ; D¯) ≥ τ ⇐⇒ CSbal( f ; D, c) ≤ c, implying the second result. 
Proof of Lemma 2. By definition,
MD( f ; D¯) = 1 − FPR( f ; D¯) − FNR( f ; D¯)
= 1 − 2 · CSbal
(
f ; D¯, 1/2) .
The subsequent implications follow trivially. 
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 10, the performance measure is
Rperf( f ; D, c) = (1 − c) · pi + E
X
[(c − η(X)) · f (X)] .
Similarly, the fairness measure is
Rfair( f ; D¯DP, c¯) = (1 − c¯) · p¯i + E
X
[(c¯ − ηDP(X)) · f (X)] .
Ignoring constants independent of f , the overall objective is thus
min
f
Rperf( f ; D, c) − λ · Rfair( f ; D¯DP, c¯)
= min
f
E
X
[((c − η(X)) − λ · (c¯ − ηDP(X))) · f (X)]
= min
f
E
X
[−s∗(x) · f (X)] .
Thus, at optimality, when s∗(x) , 0, f ∗(x) = ns∗(x) > 0o. 
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemma 10, the fairness measure is
Rfair( f ; D¯EO, c¯) = (1 − c¯) · P(Y¯ = 1 | Y = 1) + E
X |Y=1
[(c¯ − ηEO(X, 1)) · f (X)]
= (1 − c¯) · P(Y¯ = 1 | Y = 1) + E
X
[
η(X)
pi
· (c¯ − ηEO(X, 1)) · f (X)
]
,
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where the second line is from applying the importance weighting identity, and the fact that
P(X | Y = 1)
P(X) =
P(Y = 1 | X = x)
P(Y = 1) =
η(x)
pi
.
Equivalently, for suitable λ, we seek
min
f
E
X
[(
c − η(X) − λ · η(X)
pi
· (c¯ − ηEO(X, 1))
)
· f (X)
]
= min
f
E
X
[−s∗(x) · f (X)]
Thus, at optimality, when s∗(x) , 0, f ∗(x) = ns∗(x) > 0o. 
Proof of Corollary 5. We simply apply Proposition 3 to x¯ = (x, y¯). Note that
ηDP(x, y¯) = P(Y¯ = 1 | X = x, Y¯ = y¯)
= ny¯ = 1o.
Then,
f ∗(x, y¯) = 1 ⇐⇒ η(x, y¯) > c + λ · (ηDP(x, y¯) − c¯)
⇐⇒ η(x, y¯) > c + λ · (ny¯ = 1o − c¯).

Proof of Lemma 6. By Lemma 10, cost-sensitive risks are linear in the randomised classifier. In particular, for
discrete X,
Rperf( f ; D) = (1 − c) · pi + E
X
[(c − η(X)) · f (X)]
= (1 − c) · pi +
∑
x∈X
m(x) · (c − η(x)) · f (x),
where m(x) = P(X = x). Similarly,
Rfair( f ; D¯) = (1 − c¯) · pi + E
X
[(c¯ − η¯(X)) · f (X)]
= (1 − c¯) · pi +
∑
x∈X
m(x) · (c¯ − η¯(x)) · f (x).
Now let
(∀x ∈ X) a(x) .= m(x) · (c − η(x))
(∀x ∈ X) b(x) .= m(x) · (c¯ − η¯(x)) .
Then, the optimisation is
min
f
aT f : − bT f ≤ −τ
bT f ≤ 1 − τ
0 ≤ f ≤ 1.
This is a linear objective with linear constraints. We thus may find the optimal random classifier by the solution
to a linear program. 
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Proof of Lemma 7. We wish to determine whether, for any τ, τ′ ∈ R+ and λ ∈ [0, 1],
F(λτ + (1 − λ)τ′) ?≤ λF(τ) + (1 − λ)F(τ′)
⇐⇒ Rperf( f ∗λτ+(1−λ)τ′)
?≤ λRperf( f ∗τ ) + (1 − λ)Rperf( f ∗τ′)
⇐= Rperf( f ∗λτ+(1−λ)τ′)
?≤ Rperf(λ f ∗τ + (1 − λ) f ∗τ′) for convex Rperf
⇐= λ f ∗τ + (1 − λ) f ∗τ′ feasible for λτ + (1 − λ)τ′
⇐= Rfair(λ f ∗τ + (1 − λ) f ∗τ′)
?≥ λτ + (1 − λ)τ′.
By definition, f ∗τ , f ∗τ must be feasible for their corresponding problems, and so
Rfair( f ∗τ ) ≥ τ
Rfair( f ∗τ′) ≥ τ′.
We thus want to determine whether
Rfair(λ f ∗τ + (1 − λ) f ∗τ′) ≥ λτ + (1 − λ)τ′
⇐= Rfair(λ f ∗τ + (1 − λ) f ∗τ′) ≥ λRfair( f ∗τ ) + (1 − λ)Rfair( f ∗τ′)
⇐= Rfair concave.
Since Rfair is cost-sensitive, it is linear by Lemma 10, and hence concave. The result thus follows. 
Proof of Proposition 8. As argued in the body, τ∗ = Rfair( f ∗0 ; D¯). Thus, it remains to compute this quantity.
First, note that we may pick f ∗0 = nη(x) > co by Lemma 11.3 Next, observe that since Rfair is a cost-sensitive
risk,
Rfair( f ; D¯) = Rfair( f ; D¯) −min
g
Rfair(g; D¯) + min
g
Rfair( f ; D¯)
= CS( f ; D¯, c¯) −min
g
CS(g; D¯, c¯) + min
g
CS( f ; D¯, c¯)
= E
X
[(c − η¯(X)) · ( f (X) − nη¯(X) > co)] + min
g
CS( f ; D¯, c¯) by Lemma 12 .
Plugging in f ∗0 , and applying the second statement of Lemma 12,
Rfair( f ; D¯) = E
X
[|η¯(X) − c | · n(η¯(X) − c¯) · (η(X) − c) < 0o] + min
g
CS( f ; D¯, c¯).
Now we just apply Lemma 13 to the second term. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Observe that f ∗0 ∈ Argmin Rperf( f ; D). Consequently, the frontier may be re-written
F(τ) = reg( f ∗τ ; D)
where the regret or excess risk of a classifier is
reg( f ; D) = Rperf( f ; D) − min
g : X→[0,1]
Rperf(g; D).
This lets us specify the form of F(·) analytically when Rperf is a cost-sensitive risk. By Lemma 12,
F(τ) = E
X∼M
[(c − η(X)) · ( f ∗τ (X) − nη(X) > co)] .
3The behaviour of optimal solutions at η(x) = c is unconstrained; however, different choices can in fact lead to different fairness
values. Nonetheless, by picking a specific optimal solution, we are nonetheless guaranteed that picking τ∗ as defined will yield zero risk.
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Now, since f ∗τ is the solution to a linear program by Lemma 6, we can appeal to strong duality (see Appendix
D) to conclude that there exists some λ for which the corresponding soft-constrained version of the problem
(Equation 15) has the same optimal value. This means there is some Bayes-optimal classifier f ∗λ to Equation
15 for which
F(τ) = E
X∼M
[(c − η(X)) · ( f ∗λ (X) − nη(X) > co)] .
Now, if additionally this f ∗λ is deterministic, then also by Lemma 12,
F(τ) = E
X∼M
[|η(X) − c | · n(η(X) − c) · (2 f ∗λ (X) − 1) < 0o] .
Now just plug in the definition of f ∗λ from Equations 18, 17. 
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B Helper results
Lemma 10. Pick any distribution D and randomised classifier f . Then, for any cost parameter c ∈ [0, 1],
CS( f ; D, c) = (1 − c) · pi + E
X
[(c − η(X)) · f (X)]
where pi = P(Y = 1), η(x) = P(Y = 1 | X = x).
Proof of Lemma 10. By definition,
CS( f ; D, c) = (1 − c) · pi · E
X |Y=1
[1 − f (X)] + c · (1 − pi) · E
X |Y=0
[ f (X)]
= E
X
[(1 − c) · η(X) · (1 − f (X)) + c · (1 − η(X)) · f (X)]
= E
X
[(1 − c) · η(X)] + E
X
[(c · (1 − η(X)) − (1 − c) · η(X)) · f (X)]
= (1 − c) · pi + E
X
[(c · (1 − η(X)) − (1 − c) · η(X)) · f (X)]
= (1 − c) · pi + E
X
[(c − η(X)) · f (X)] .
The second line is since P(X | Y = 1) · P(Y = 1) = P(X) · P(Y = 1 | X). 
Lemma 11. Pick any distribution D and cost parameter c ∈ [0, 1]. Let
(∀x ∈ X) s∗(x) = η(x) − c
where η(x) = P(Y = 1 | X = x). Then, any randomised classifier f ∗ satisfying
(∀x ∈ X) s∗(x) , 0 =⇒ f ∗(x) = ns∗(x) > 0o
minimises CS( f ; D, c).
Proof of Lemma 11. By Lemma 10, we need to find, for each x ∈ X
min
f (x)∈[0,1]
(c − η(x)) · f (x) = min
f (x)∈[0,1]
−s∗(x) · f (x),
observing that the minimisation may be done pointwise. Clearly, it is optimal to predict f ∗(x) = 1 when
s∗(x) > 0, and f ∗(x) = 0 when η(x) < c. When η(x) = c, any prediction is optimal. 
Lemma 12. Pick any distribution Djnt and cost parameter c ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for any randomised classifier f ,
CS( f ; D, c) − min
g : X→[0,1]
CS(g; D, c) = E
X
[(c − η(X)) · ( f (X) − nη(X) > co)] .
If further f ∈ {0, 1}X,
CS( f ; D, c) − min
g : X→[0,1]
CS(g; D, c) = E
X
[|η(X) − c | · n(η(X) − c) · (2 f (x) − 1) < 0o] .
Proof of Lemma 12. ByLemma 11, an optimal classifier for Rperf(g; D) is the deterministic f ∗(x) = nη(x) > co.
Thus, plugging this into Lemma 10,
CS( f ; D, c) − min
g : X→[0,1]
CS(g; D, c) = E
X
[(c − η(X)) · ( f (X) − nη(X) > co)] .
The second statement follows from a simple case analysis. The difference f (x) − nη(x) > co takes on the
value +1 when f (x) = 1 and η(x) < c, and −1 when f (x) = 0 and η(x) > c, i.e. the value sign(c − η(x)) when
2 f − 1 and η(x) − c disagree in sign. Since |z | = z · sign(z), the result follows. 
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Lemma 13. Pick any distribution Djnt and cost parameter c ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
min
f : X→[0,1]
CS( f ; D, c) = −Iϕ(P(X | Y = 1), P(X | Y = 0))
where I f (·, ·) denotes the f -divergence between distributions, and
ϕ(t) = −min ((1 − c) · pi · t, c · (1 − pi)) .
Proof of Lemma 13. This follows from Reid and Williamson [2011, Theorem 9], applied as follows. Let
f ∗(x) = nη(x) > co + 12 · nη(x) = co, which is an optimal classifier for CS( f ; D, c) by Lemma 11. Then,
CS( f ∗; D, c) = E
(X,Y)∼D
[`(Y, η(X))]
where ` is the cost-sensitive loss given by
`(1, v) = (1 − c) ·
(
nv < co + 1
2
nv = co
)
`(0, v) = c ·
(
nv > co + 1
2
nv = co
)
.
Now, ` is proper in the sense of Reid and Williamson [2010]. Consequently,
E
(X,Y)∼D
[`(Y, η(X))] = min
ηˆ : X→[0,1]
E
(X,Y)∼D
[`(Y, ηˆ(X))] .
The right hand side above is the Bayes-risk for the proper loss ` in the sense of Reid and Williamson [2011].
Consequently, by Reid and Williamson [2011, Theorem 9],
E
(X,Y)∼D
[`(Y, η(X))] = −Iϕ(P(X | Y = 1), P(X | Y = 0)),
where
ϕ(t) = −min ((1 − c) · pi · t, c · (1 − pi)) .
This may be verified easily, since
CS( f ∗; D, c) = E
X
[
(1 − c) · η(X) ·
(
nη(x) < co + 1
2
· nη(x) = co
)
+ c · (1 − η(X)) ·
(
nη(x) > co + 1
2
· nη(x) = co
)]
= E
X
[min((1 − c) · η(X), c · (1 − η(X)))] ,
while, if P = P(X | Y = 1),Q = P(X | Y = 0) with densities p, q,
−Iϕ(P,Q) = − E
X∼Q
[
ϕ
(
p(X)
q(X)
)]
= E
X∼Q
[
min
(
(1 − c) · pi · p(X)
q(X), c · (1 − pi)
)]
= E
X∼M
[
min
(
(1 − c) · pi · p(X)
m(X), c · (1 − pi) ·
q(X)
m(X)
)]
= E
X∼M
[min ((1 − c) · η(X), c · (1 − η(X)))]
= CS( f ∗; D, c).

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Corollary 14. Pick any distribution Djnt, costs c, c¯ ∈ [0, 1], and λ ∈ R. Let
s∗(x, 0) =
(
1 + λ · pi−1 · c¯
)
· η(x, 0) − c
s∗(x, 1) =
(
1 − λ · pi−1 · (1 − c¯)
)
· η(x, 1) − c
where η(x, y¯) = P(Y = 1 | X = x, Y¯ = y¯) Then,
Argmin
f ∈[0,1]X
R( f ; D, D¯EO, c, c¯, λ) =
{
f ∗ | (∀x ∈ X) s∗(x) , 0 =⇒ f ∗(x) = ns∗(x) > 0o}.
Proof of Corollary 14. Plug in η¯(x, y¯) = ny¯ = 1o into Proposition 4. 
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C Symmetrised fairness when p¯i , 1/2
The presentation of symmetrised in the body noted that one needs to guard against anti-classifiers. However,
the proposal
Rfair( f ; D¯) = Rfair( f ; D¯) ∧ Rfair(1 − f ; D¯)
is maximised when using the constant classifier f = 1/2. It is preferable for the fairness measure to instead be
maximised when f = p¯i, which would be the optimal prior prediction before we get a chance to look at the data.
In fact, this is easy to achieve by modifying
Rfair( f ; D¯) = ((1 − α) · Rfair( f ; D¯)) ∧ (α · Rfair(1 − f ; D¯))
where α = Rfair(p¯i; D¯), so that we asymmetrically penalise raw fairness scores below and above those of
Rfair(p¯i; D¯). Note that this would simply introduce additional asymmetric scalings into our results, e.g. for
bounds relating the symmetrised disparate impact to a cost-sensitive risk (Lemma 1).
23
D Relating the constrained and unconstrained objectives
Consider the constrained version of the fairness problem,
f ∗ ∈ Argmin
f ∈[0,1]X
Rperf( f ; D) : Rfair( f ; D¯) ≥ τ.
By Lemma 6, for finite X, this is expressible as the solution to a linear program
min
f ∈F
aT f
where
F = { f | bT f ∈ [τ, 1 − τ], 0 ≤ f (x) ≤ 1}
and
(∀x ∈ X) a(x) .= m(x) · (c − η(x))
(∀x ∈ X) b(x) .= m(x) · (c¯ − η¯(x)) .
Now, by strong duality for linear programs4, we have
min
f ∈F
aT f = max
λ1,λ2≥0
(
min
f ∈[0,1]X
(a − λ1b + λ2b)T f
)
+ λ1τ − λ2(1 − τ). (26)
Observe now that the inner optimisation is
min
f ∈[0,1]X
(a − λ1b + λ2b)T f
= min
f ∈[0,1]X
(a − (λ1 − λ2)b)T f
= min
f ∈[0,1]X
∑
x∈X
m(x) · [c − η(x) − (λ1 − λ2) (c¯ − η¯(x))] · f (x)
= min
f ∈[0,1]X
E
X
[(c − η(X) − (λ1 − λ2) (c¯ − η¯(X))) · f (X)]
= min
f ∈[0,1]X
CS( f ; D, c) − (λ1 − λ2) · CS( f ; D¯, c¯).
That is, we solve Equation 15 for λ = λ1 − λ2. By sweeping over λ, we can thus in principle find the one which
achieves the highest value of the objective in Equation 26, and consequently find the solution to the constrained
problem for a fixed τ.
Note that strong duality guarantees agreement of the objective functions. In general, it does not mean that
every optimal solution to the inner problem (for optimal λ1, λ2) will also be optimal for the original constrained
problem. As an extreme case, suppose that η¯ = η, and c = c¯. Then, the constrained problem has optimal
solution any f for which CS( f ; D¯, c¯) = τ, so that the frontier is linear. On the other hand, we will find that for
the optimal λ1, λ2, the inner optimisation is simply of the constant 0, in which case every f is deemed optimal.
4This implicitly assumes feasibility of the primal problem, i.e. that we pick τ such that it is possible to find a randomised classifier with
symmetrised fairness at least τ.
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E A survey of fairness in philosophy and welfare economics
Fairness lies at the heart of justice, which is “the first virtue of social institutions” [Rawls, 1971, p. 586]. But
what is fairness? Rawls develops a theory of fairness utilizing the “veil of ignorance” whereby a person’s
position in society is held to be unknown while designing the rules of a just society. The analogue in machine
learning is that membership of a given category should not be used, one way or another, in determining
outcomes for an individual. Analogous theories such as that of [Harsanyi, 1955] and [Sen, 2009] differ
in what ignorance means (uniform prior over what role one has, or the perspective of a separate impartial
observer). In all cases, the general idea is that a just outcome should not depend (either way) on membership
of a particular category, but should focus upon the individual; Rawls [1971] motivates his approach by saying
“utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons” (page 26) because it is only concerned
with average welfare. While these ideas have had profound impact on political philosophy, their translation
into mathematical theories is lacking. With few exceptions [Bimore, 1994, Binmore, 2005], there is little
formal utilitarian literature that grapples with fairness.
Rawls argues the advantages of “pure procedural justice” where the attainment of justice (hence fairness) is a
consequence of the process followed, not the outcome obtained. This is, of course, taken for granted in machine
learning and statistics, where one analyses a procedure, not the results of the procedure on a given set of data.
Taking this principle seriously means that protected attributes have to be identified ahead of time, and not after
the fact because you did not like the outcome; confer the analogous problem in designing electoral districts:
getting the process right makes the problem straightforward [Vickrey, 1961]; attempting to judge fairness a
posteriori is a mess, with infinite arguments possible about whether a boundary is “bizarre” [Chambers and
Miller, 2010].
The theory we present here follows the precept of Sen [2009, Chapter 18] that mere identification of “fully
just social arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient.” We embrace Sen’s pragmatism by focussing on
the quantifiable tradeoffs one might make to approach (certain notions of) fairness and hence justice. Rawls
acknowledges that there will be tradeoffs between overall social utility and fairness (pp37ff) but tries to argue
what the “right” tradeoff is. We do not try to solve that question, believing instead there is unlikely to be a
universal right tradoff, and instead focus upon merely quantifying what the tradeoffs might be. Focussing upon
quantifying the traedoff between utility and fairness has only very recently drawn attention in the machine
learning literature [Johnson et al., 2016].
The approaches to fairness in the machine learning literature, which we follow in this paper, focusses on
the notion of a protected attribute, and assumes that both its choice is manifest, and indeed it is a sensible
categorisation (e.g. notions of race). One should take care with this though, because any such categories to
which people are assigned to are not intrinsic to the world, but another choice that we make [Lakoff, 1987],
which can be highly ambiguous and contested [Bowker and Star, 1999].
Singling out particular attributes to be protected (as opposed to the rather more sweeping requirements of Rawls’
full theory that requires no specific attributes be taken into account) opens the door to the problems inherent in
the “ecological fallacy” [Kramer, 1983] — making inferences about individuals based on membership in a
category, which is precisely what some argue one should not do [Lippert-Rasmussen, 2011].
Indeed the very notions of fairness studied in this paper glaringly fails the test against “discrimination” if one
adopts a standard definition (e.g. from Wikipedia):
In human social affairs, discrimination is treatment or consideration of, or making a distinction
in favour or against a person or thing based on the group, class, or category to which that person
or thing is perceived to belong rather than on individual merit.
By that definition, the only non-discriminatory approach is to ignore the protected attributes entirely and take
the outcome as it comes. Reconciling this tension remains a challenge!
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F Relating disparate impact and balanced error
Following Feldman et al. [2015], we explore the relationship between the balanced error and disparate impact.
Intuitively, we expect that when the balanced error of a classifier is low – meaning that the classifier accurately
predicts the sensitive variable – we will have disparate impact. Conversely, we might hope that possessing
disparate impact implies a low balanced error. Can we formalise a relationship akin to Lemma 2?
We have the following relations between the two quantities. In what follows, let
BER( f ; D¯) = FPR( f ; D¯) + FNR( f ; D¯)
2
.
Lemma 15. Pick any distribution D¯ and randomised classifier f : X→ [0, 1] with FNR( f ; D¯) , 1. Then,
DI( f ; D¯) = FPR( f ; D¯)
1 − 2 · BER( f ; D¯) + FPR( f ; D¯)
=
2 · BER( f ; D¯) − FNR( f ; D¯)
1 − FNR( f ; D¯) ,
(27)
and similarly
BER( f ; D¯) = 1
2
· FNR( f ; D¯) + 1
2
· (1 − FNR( f ; D¯)) · DI( f ; D¯)
=
1
2
· FPR( f ; D¯) + 1
2
·
(
1 − FPR( f ; D¯)
DI( f ; D¯)
)
.
(28)
Proof of Lemma 15. These are trivial consequences of the fact that, by definition of DI( f ; D¯) (Equation 7),
FPR( f ; D¯) = (1 − FNR( f ; D¯)) · DI( f ; D¯).

We now turn to relating a bound on the balanced error to a bound on the disparate impact factor. The following
is a minor generalisation of Feldman et al. [2015, Theorem 4.1] to account for disparate impact at any level.
Lemma 16. Pick any distribution D¯ and randomised classifier f : X→ [0, 1] with FNR( f ; D¯) , 1. Then, for
any  ∈ [0, 12 ],
BER( f ; D¯) ≤  ⇐⇒ DI( f ; D¯) ≤ FPR( f ; D¯)
1 − 2 ·  + FPR( f ; D¯) ∧
2 ·  − FNR( f ; D¯)
1 − FNR( f ; D¯) ,
and for any τ ∈ [0, 1],
DI( f ; D¯) ≤ τ ⇐⇒ BER( f ; D¯) ≤
(
τ
2
+
1 − τ
2
· FNR( f ; D¯)
)
∧
(
1
2
− 1 − τ
2 · τ · FPR( f ; D¯)
)
.
Proof of Lemma 16. The first equivalence follows from the two expressions in Equation 27, and the fact that
the dependence on BER( f ; D¯) is monotone increasing.
This second equivalence follows from the two expressions in Equation 28, and the fact that the dependence on
DI( f ; D¯) is monotone increasing. 
When τ = 0.8, this means that
DI( f ; D¯) ≤ 0.8 ⇐⇒ BER( f ; D¯) ≤
(
2
5
+
1
10
· FNR( f ; D¯)
)
∧
(
1
2
− 1
8
· FPR( f ; D¯)
)
.
26
F.1 Low balanced error implies disparate impact
It is of interest to remove the dependence of the above bounds on the false positive and negative rates of f . For
one direction, this is possible.
Corollary 17. Pick any distribution D¯ and randomised classifier f : X→ [0, 1] with FNR( f ; D¯) , 1. Then,
for any  ∈ [0, 12 ],
BER( f ; D¯) ≤  =⇒ DI( f ; D¯) ≤ 2 · ,
or for any τ ∈ [0, 1],
DI( f ; D¯) ≥ τ =⇒ BER( f ; D¯) ≥ τ
2
.
Proof. The first bound follows from Lemma 16 and the fact that if BER( f ; D¯) ≤  , it must be true that
FPR( f ; D¯) ∨ FNR( f ; D¯) ≤ 2 ·  . The second bound is the contrapositive of the first. 
Corollary 17 says that with a balanced error of τ2 or less, we are guaranteed a disparate impact of level at least
τ, though possibly worse. So, if we want to guarantee a lack of disparate impact at level τ, it is necessary that
the balanced error be at least τ2 . But is this condition also sufficient? Unfortunately, it is not.
F.2 Disparate impact does not imply low balanced error
It is evident from Lemma 16 that regardless of the precise level of impact τ, we could have a classifier with
balanced error arbitrarily close to 12 . The basic issue is that by driving the false positive rate to 0, we trivially
have disparate impact. By further driving the false negative rate to 0 (i.e. by predicting everything negative),
we trivially have a balanced error rate of 12 .
Corollary 18. Pick any distribution D¯. Then, for any τ ∈ [0, 1] there exists a classifier f : X→ {0, 1} with
BER( f ; D¯) = 1
2
DI( f ; D¯) ≤ τ.
Proof. Consider the trivial classifier with
FPR( f ; D¯) = 0
FNR( f ; D¯) = 1.
Clearly, this has balanced error 12 . Evidently, this classifier also has disparate impact at level τ. 
Corollary 18 says that even if we have a classifier with high balanced error, there is no guarantee it will not have
disparate impact. This is a worst case analysis over all possible classifiers we might have obtained. However,
if we happen to know the false positive and negative rates we actually have obtained, we might be able to
conclude there is no disparate impact. This is used in Feldman et al. [2015, Section 4.2] to certify the lack of
disparate impact for a particular classifier.
Corollary 19. Pick any distribution D¯ and randomised classifier f : X→ [0, 1]. For any τ ∈ [0, 1],
BER( f ; D¯) ≥
(
τ
2
+
1 − τ
2
· FNR( f ; D¯)
)
∧
(
1
2
− 1 − τ
2 · τ · FPR( f ; D¯)
)
⇐⇒ DI( f ; D¯) ≥ τ.
Proof of Corollary 19. This is the contrapositive of Lemma 16. 
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G Additional experiments
We present a further experiment on the synthetic dataset considered in Zafar et al. [2016], where P(Y = 1) = 0.5,
each X | Y = y ∼ N(µy, Σy) where
µ1 =
[
2 2
]
Σ1 =
[
5 1
1 5
]
µ0 =
[
10 1
1 3
]
Σ0 =
[−2 −2] ,
and
P(Y¯ = 1 | X = x) = P(X = Rx | Y = 1)
P(X = Rx | Y = 1) + P(X = Rx | Y = −1)
for rotation matrix R =
[
cos φ − sin φ
sin φ cos φ
]
. We pick φ = 0.5.
We generated N = 104 samples from this distribution, and followed the same setup as the body: we construct a
2:1 train-test split, and compare COV and our plugin (2LR) approach in terms of the balanced error of predicting
Y, versus the MD score in predicting Y¯.
Figure 4(a) shows the tradeoff curves of the methods closely track each other. However, the plugin approach
performs slightly worse at higher fairness levels. We conjecture this is due to the fact that logistic regression
is not suitable for η, η¯, as the class-conditionals have non-isotropic covariance and thus possess quadratic
boundaries. When we explicitly include quadratic features as input to both methods, Figure 4(b) shows that the
plugin approach performs slightly better than COV.
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Figure 4: Comparison of plugin (2LR) and COV methods as tuning parameters for both are varied, synthetic 2D
Gaussian data.
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